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assertion that there is nothing intrinsically immoral about 
playing ‘violent’ video games, but nevertheless argues 
against the idea that the laconic mantra “it’s just a game” is 
a legitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to (typically vio-
lent) video game content (Ostritsch 2017). Instead, Ostritsch 
argues that video games—or rather their respective game-
plays considered holistically—should be the object of moral 
scrutiny and, where appropriate, liable to moral condemna-
tion. In particular, he defends the following position: where 
a video game taken as a whole endorses an immoral world-
view then the video game is immoral. He also argues that to 
enjoy such a game (based on a specific sense of enjoyment) 
is itself an immoral thing to do.
In this paper, I raise three objections to the position just 
described. Not because I seek to champion the amoralist 
cause, or because I disagree with the position Ostritsch 
adopts—at least, not after qualification—but, rather, because 
I find problematic the manner in which he defends his posi-
tion. The first objection concerns a somewhat crude cat-
egory Ostritsch employs when differentiating between ways 
of enjoying a video game: namely: ‘enjoyment in a strong 
sense’. In opposition to this, I present a finer-grained means 
of differentiating between player enjoyment based on two 
distinct motivations, each compatible with Ostritsch’s strong 
sense of ‘to enjoy’. These are used to expose not only the 
lack of refinement evident in Ostritsch’s strong sense but, 
also, owing to this lack of refinement, a potential contra-
dictory dependency relation between (allegedy) immoral 
gameplays and the immorality of player enjoyment. Next, I 
question Ostritsch’s means of justifying his claim that cer-
tain video games are immoral. I examine what is involved in 
making such a claim and, given this, what would be required 
for a normative position to be established: something that 
has yet to be established, I contend. Thus, while I accept, in 
principle, that it is immoral to enjoy (in a particular sense 
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Introduction
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to be discussed) an immoral video game, I am nevertheless 
sceptical about the examples this moral judgement is predi-
cated on (i.e., the games Ostritsch identifies as immoral). 
Finally, I challenge the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim 
that players are morally obliged not to play certain games 
in certain ways (i.e., games endorsing immorality as ‘fun 
games’). In order to do this, I distinguish between immoral 
and suberogatory actions, claiming that the latter is more 
applicable to the examples Ostritsch has in mind (owing to 
my aforementioned scepticism over his claim to have iden-
tified immoral games). Therefore, even if it is considered 
better (qua a socially preferred state of affairs) not to enjoy 
engaging in the enactments afforded by these games, one is 
not morally obliged not to do so, despite Ostritsch’s avowal 
to the contrary.
In the next section I present a brief overview of Ostritsch’s 
position before discussing the objections noted above in 
more detail (“Ostritsch’s strong sense of ‘enjoyment’ needs 
refining”, “How does one determine whether a gameplay is 
endorsing immorality?” and “What does Ostritsch mean by 
moral obligation?” sections). In the final section (“Conclu-
sion” section), I conclude with a few remarks on the impli-
cations of my objections to Ostritsch’s position, as well as 
video game morality more generally.
Ostritsch’s position in brief
Ostritsch targets (although not exclusively) two single-player 
video games when mounting his attack on the amoralists’ 
position: RapeLay and, later, Hatred.1 With reference to the 
former, he states that “it is quite easy to name examples 
of real computer games that even gamers will find morally 
appalling (2017, p. 117; emphasis added), before adding: 
“If the amoralist is right, then our moralist intuition about 
playing games such as RapeLay is the product of a category 
mistake” (ibid., pp. 117–118). He makes further reference to 
our moral intuition when he states: “What makes the amoral-
ist position so disturbing is that it challenges our intuition 
that, e.g., virtual rape is in itself… morally repugnant” (ibid., 
p. 119). And again when alluding to his own position: “[I]
t is nevertheless possible to sustain the intuition that there 
is something morally wrong about games like RapeLay. I 
claim that we can save our moralist intuition if we locate the 
moral wrongness not in the activity of gaming but rather in 
the games themselves” (ibid., p. 118).
Because Ostritsch’s aim is to emphasize the immorality 
of certain video game content (in accordance with our intui-
tion), rather than gaming per se, he rejects (wholly or in part) 
two established means of criticizing the amoralist challenge 
(although not solely for this reason): the consequentialist 
and expressivist approaches. Consequentialism is essen-
tially the view that there are real (a posteriori discoverable) 
consequences to playing video games, whether positive or 
negative. In the context of ‘violent’ video games, a conse-
quentialist-based argument against such content would hold 
that these consequences can be negative, despite amoralist 
claims to the contrary. The expressivist, on the other hand, 
holds, “that playing certain games reveals something about 
our character, namely that it is morally flawed” (Ostritsch 
2017, p. 120; emphasis in original). But, also, that when cul-
tivated through the playing of certain games, this flaw could 
have real-life (negative) consequences. Ostritsch’s criticism 
of the latter position is more nuanced, it is fair to say, and 
perhaps amounts to an amendment rather than an outright 
rejection of expressivist views. Nevertheless, for Ostritsch, 
what is unpalatable and worthy of criticism is where these 
two approaches locate their moral concern:
The consequentialist arguments employed by the utili-
tarian and the virtue ethicist [i.e., expressivist] relocate 
the moral wrongness of virtual actions outside of the 
virtual realm, thereby effectively supporting the amor-
alist claim that there is nothing inherently wrong about 
virtually raping a non-player character. But this is 
exactly where our moralist intuitions seem to lie. It is 
hard to see how our moral indignation towards the fact 
that someone is carrying out virtual rape should be the 
result of our reasoning that this will lead to something 
morally bad in reality rather than it being something 
bad in itself as a virtual action. (ibid., pp. 119 − 20; 
emphasis in original).
For Ostritsch, then, irrespective of whether it can be 
shown that there are real negative consequences to playing 
video games like RapeLay, and irrespective of whether play-
ing such games reveals something about our moral charac-
ter—that it is flawed (along with the potential negative con-
sequences of this)—both of these attacks on the amoralist 
stance fail to acknowledge adequately the moral significance 
of the virtual content alone, and therefore the message the 
game as a whole is conveying and thus purportedly prompt-
ing us to endorse (to borrow Ostritsch’s term). As a reaction 
to this, Ostritsch presents his endorsement view:
I will defend the position that a game can rightly be 
called immoral if it prompts us to transfer the abhor-
rent worldview of a fictional setting to the real world, 
thus rendering the amoralist slogan “It’s only a game!” 
false. (p. 118; emphasis added).
1 In RapeLay, the protagonist stalks, sexually assaults and rapes 
women. In Hatred, one’s goal as a player is to engage in the mass 
shooting and killing of unarmed civilians, including brutal execu-
tions.
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In the sections to follow I present more of Ostritsch’s 
argument against amoralism, as I undertake to criticize it. I 
begin with an objection to a particular aspect of his double 
sense of ‘to enjoy’, which he introduces as a way of amend-
ing the amoralist’s challenge.
Ostritsch’s strong sense of ‘enjoyment’ needs 
refining
We know that, for expressivists, enjoying representations 
of immoral acts (such as rape) is a symptom of a morally 
flawed character and, moreover, will continue to harm 
one’s moral character through the repetition of simulated 
vice (McCormick 2001). Because of this, enjoying repre-
sentations of immoral acts is immoral. Ostritsch finds this 
last claim problematic; it is problematic because he holds 
that such a generalized judgement about the immorality of 
one’s enjoyment fails to take account of the different ways 
in which we might enjoy playing a video game: for this may 
differ between gamers in relation to a particular game, or 
within a particular gamer at different times and in relation 
to different games. As Ostritsch explains:
… “to enjoy” can be understood in a weak (or rather 
minimal), and a strong sense. The minimal sense of “to 
enjoy” just means to be captured or to be fascinated by 
something, while the strong sense of the word means 
to experience something as cheerful or fun (2017, 
p. 120)
With reference to video games like RapeLay and 
Hatred, even if (for the sake of argument) voluntarily 
playing such games means enjoying them on some level, 
Ostritsch nevertheless notes that it does not follow (nec-
essarily) from this that one’s enjoyment is of the strong 
kind; rather, it may be more appropriate to describe one’s 
enjoyment in the weaker (or minimal), and hence less mor-
ally problematic, sense. If one’s enjoyment is confined to 
this weaker form then the amoralist is correct to challenge 
the connection between enjoyment and immorality. In 
other words, when using the verb “to enjoy” in Ostritsch’s 
weaker sense, it does not necessarily follow that enjoy-
ing simulating immoral acts is itself immoral.2 I concur. 
Yet, importantly, Ostritsch adds that where one does enjoy 
playing a game in the stronger sense, sometimes (alluding 
to the aforementioned games) this is morally problematic. 
If it is morally problematic to enjoy playing these game 
in this way then it cannot be solely down to the virtual 
content itself, because one could enjoy (in a weaker sense) 
interacting with this same content without being morally 
admonished for doing so. Rather, a problem arises for the 
amoralist, if it can be shown that it is “wrong to play a 
certain game with a certain attitude or mindset” (Ostritsch 
2017, p. 122). An attitude or mindset that is compatible 
with the stronger sense of enjoyment, it would seem. This 
being the case:
1. To enjoy (in a weaker sense, and with a concomitant 
mindset) playing video games like RapeLay or Hatred 
is not morally problematic and therefore not a challenge 
to amoralism.
2. To enjoy (in a stronger sense, and with a concomitant 
mindset) playing video games that are not like RapeLay 
or Hatred (e.g., the Football Manager series or Super 
Mario, and so on) is not morally problematic and there-
fore not a challenge to amoralism.
But
3. To enjoy (in a stronger sense, and with a concomitant 
mindset) playing video games like RapeLay or Hatred 
is morally problematic and therefore is a challenge to 
amoralism.
What Ostritsch is suggesting is that the manner of the 
moral judgement about the way a player interacts with the 
gaming content (i.e., enjoying doing so in a strong sense) 
is dependent on the moral status of the gameplay when 
viewed holistically (as can be seen when one contrasts 
point 2 with point 3 above). This, Ostritsch proposes, is 
a problem for amoralism because it proffers an example 
of an act of video game play that is a legitimate object 
of moral inquiry and, given the cases we are discussing, 
moral condemnation.
I wish to challenge the connection Ostritsch makes 
between player enjoyment (in a strong sense; hereaf-
ter,  enjoyments) and gaming content. I wish to do this 
not because I consider it to be wrong in principle but, 
rather, because it is too crude and is therefore in need 
of refinement. By drawing a distinction between two dif-
ferent forms of player motivation, which are nonetheless 
compatible with Ostritsch’s notion of  enjoyments, I will 
demonstrate how one of these refined forms of  enjoyments 
severs the dependency of player morality on the morality 
of gaming content, thereby undermining the very thing 
Ostritsch tries to establish. It is my further contention that 
if we fail to distinguish explicitly between these different 
forms of  enjoyments, given that they are compatible with 
Ostritsch’s original notion of  enjoyments, the following 
contradiction is inevitable:
2 In Ostritsch’s own words: “If we apply the minimal sense of the 
word, it is far from clear why it should be a moral flaw to enjoy play-




 (i) The moral condemnation of those who  enjoys x is 
dependent on whether x prompt us to endorse immo-
rality
 (ii) The moral condemnation of those who  enjoys x is not 
dependent on whether x prompt us to endorse immo-
rality
Of course, we can easily avoid the contradiction if we 
make (i) and (ii) conditional on certain cases, so that it is true 
that in certain cases the dependency relation exists and in 
certain cases it does not. But in order to distinguish between 
cases, we need to refine Ostritsch’s notion of  enjoyments.
The case for dependency
To support my claim that Ostritsch’s notion of  enjoyments is 
too crude, I will contrast it with Young’s (2013) discussion 
on player motivation. According to Young, one motivation 
for enacting real-world violence or otherwise taboo activi-
ties involves enjoyment. One is motivated by the belief that 
a particular enactment will elicit thrills, excitement: in short, 
fun. This motivation Young calls  M(enjoyment), which takes 
the following form:
M(enjoyment): S engages in the virtual act because S antici-
pates that it will be fun/thrilling. S anticipates that it will be 
fun/thrilling because the virtual act represents something 
that is taboo. In short, S desires to engage in the virtual 
enactment because the symbolic violation of the real-world 
taboo (i.e., what the virtual enactment represents), in virtue 
of being the enactment of a taboo, is something S anticipates 
deriving enjoyment from.
It is my contention that  M(enjoyment) is compatible with 
what Ostritsch takes a strong sense of enjoyment to involve. 
What is absent from Ostritsch’s discussion, however—
although it may be implied—is the following considera-
tion: that the appeal of violent video games and why people 
are drawn to them may well involve the belief/knowledge 
that they are, in a somewhat imprecise sense, ‘immoral’. 
By that, I mean that it is understood that certain aspects of 
their gameplay represent immorality, and that is part of their 
appeal (Nys 2010). To reiterate, Ostritsch does not make 
this point explicitly, although he does distinguish between 
what a gameplay is endorsing and what it represents; add-
ing that the two should not be confused. But even in the 
case of representing violence (or other taboos), rather than 
endorsing it, the amoralist’s claim that it’s just a game risks 
“implausibly sever[ing] all ties between the fictional and the 
non-fictional” (Ostritsch 2017, p. 122). Yet these ties are 
precisely what  M(enjoyment) recognizes and even embraces: for 
it is not inconceivable that enacting virtual violence holds a 
certain allure for some people because they  enjoys engaging 
in simulated immorality and perhaps even identifying with 
the ‘bad guy’ (Schulzke 2011; see also; Konijn and Hoorn 
2005). In fact, for Juul (2005), video games “are playgrounds 
where players can experiment with doing things they… 
would not normally do”; whereas, for Jansz (2005), they act 
as “private laboratories” (p. 231) within which gamers can 
engage with different emotions and identities, and invest in 
their own form of psychological exploration (see also Konijn 
et al. 2011). Such exploration might occur within a games-
pace where social and moral conventions are quite probably 
violated and this is likely to add to their  enjoyments (Whi-
taker et al. 2013); conversely, for others, it may elicit disgust, 
irritation or guilt. For others still, it might result in them 
being both disgusted and thrilled by the virtual violence they 
enact (Rubenking and Lang 2014), so much so that they 
willingly become what Jansz (2005) calls the architects of 
their own disgust; all of which adds to their  enjoyments and 
motivation to continue.
In the case of enacting real-world taboos (but not exclu-
sively so), the activity has symbolic transcendence insofar as 
it represents in one space that which is taboo in another. The 
action is therefore psychologically meaningful not only in 
terms of understanding what it represents, but also as a moti-
vation to engage in the activity in the first place: because it 
is fun in virtue of what it represents, or at least that is what 
the player anticipates. In accordance with  M(enjoyment), then, 
for some, simulating virtual violence is appealing precisely 
because it involves enacting taboos and therefore violating 
a real-world moral code.
According to Young, the gamer who is motivated by 
 enjoyments (qua  M(enjoyment) relishes the idea of enacting 
a taboo because it represents that which is taboo. That is 
what is (anticipated to be) thrilling and fun, and this can be 
achieved without wishing to endorse the real-life equiva-
lent of the virtual act. Ostritsch would perhaps be willing 
to concede this point, if one were to limit one’s  enjoyments 
to a game that sought only to represent violence or oth-
erwise taboo activities, rather than (allegedly) endorsing 
them. Given this, it appears that, for Ostritsch, a player 
who is motivated to play a game like Hatred or RapeLay, 
in a manner captured by  M(enjoyment), (as a refined form of 
 enjoyments) would be acting immorally not because of the 
individual enactments themselves taken in isolation, or what 
is motivating their engagement with these enactments (i.e., 
their  enjoyments per se, qua  M(enjoyment)), but because of the 
fact that they would be deriving  enjoyments from a game 
that they knew was endorsing immorality, thereby further 
endorsing the immorality of the content through their inap-
propriate reaction to the gameplay (i.e., enjoying it in the 
manner discussed).
In such a situation, whether one should be morally con-
demned for  enjoyings (qua  M(enjoyment)) the game is depend-
ent on what the gameplay is allegedly endorsing (not sim-
ply representing); it is conditional on this. What this means 
is that if a gameplay endorses immorality, one should not 
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 enjoys playing the game, whereas if a gameplay (taken as a 
whole) is not endorsing immorality, but merely represents it 
through individual enactments, then the same level of enjoy-
ment should not be considered morally reprehensible.
If we accept the truth of the proposition “endorsing 
immorality is immoral”—a fairly uncontroversial position 
to adopt—then it would seem that, for Ostritsch,  enjoyings 
that which endorses immorality is itself a form of endorse-
ment and hence immoral. More formally:
1. Endorsing the immoral is immoral.
2. Where x prompts us to endorse immorality,
3. and where S  enjoyss x,
4. then S  enjoyss that which endorses immorality.
5. Enjoyings that which endorses immorality is itself an 
endorsement of immorality.
6. Therefore, S’s  enjoyments of x is immoral.
Replacing ‘enjoyss’ (and its derivatives) with  M(enjoyment) 
in 1–6 does not undermine Ostritsch’s position with regard 
to the dependency relation he sets out to achieve between 
player  enjoyments and video game content, nor does it derail 
its use as a means of amending the amoralist’s challenge. 
Therefore, in order to challenge this dependency relation, 
and hence Ostritsch’s use of the verb “to enjoy” (in a strong 
sense), I need to identify an example of where this depend-
ency relation breaks down. With this in mind, consider the 
following:
 7. Where x does not prompt us to endorse immorality,
 8. and S  enjoyss x,
 9. then S is  enjoyings something that is not prompting us 
to endorse immorality.
 10. Enjoyings something that is not prompting us to 
endorse immorality is not immoral
 11. Therefore S’s  enjoyments of x is not immoral.
The conclusion in 11 does not necessarily follow from 
premises 7–10. One could also question the truth of premise 
10. This is because the reasoning employed in this example 
is grounded on a sufficient condition for immorality not a 
necessary one (i.e., that enjoying x is immoral if x prompts 
us to endorse immorality). As such, it may be that there is 
some other reason for morally condemning S’s enjoyments 
of x that is independent of whether x endorses immorality (a 
point that also applies to premise 10).
The case against dependency
For an example of what this other reason might be, I again 
turn to Young (2013), who presents a further motivation for 
enacting real-world prohibited actions: namely,  M(substitution).
M(substitution): S desires to engage in a particular real-world 
activity which happens to be taboo. This activity is repre-
sented by the virtual act. S therefore desires to engage in the 
virtual act (say, murder or rape or paedophilia) not because 
it is taboo (as is the case in  M(enjoyment)) but because it rep-
resents the real-world activity S desires to engage in (which 
happens to be taboo). Enacting the real-world taboo affords 
S the opportunity to satisfy this desire, vicariously.
According to  M(substitution), a player who is motivated to 
engage in virtual rape (for example) is not motivated to 
do so because the enactment represents something that is 
taboo (in others words, they are not thrilled/excited by the 
fact that what they are enacting is taboo in the real-world). 
Instead, the player is motivated to enact, in a virtual context, 
that which they desire to engage in for real, which just so 
happens to be taboo. What is motivating this player (and, 
importantly, bringing them  enjoyments) is not the fact that 
the enactment is taboo, but that it acts as a substitute for 
what they desire for real.
The act of virtual rape is not in and of itself morally 
problematic, as Ostritsch attests. In the case of  M(substitution), 
what is morally problematic (I take as a given) is the desire 
to rape for real and therefore the player’s endorsement of 
the act they really desire (i.e., actual rape) through the vir-
tual enactment afforded by the gameplay. Importantly, then, 
player endorsement is independent of any endorsement of 
rape prompted by the game content, meaning the former can 
occur in the absence of latter.
This is a problem for Ostritsch because it is my conten-
tion that  M(substitution) is also compatible with his notion of 
 enjoyments. Yet, for Ostritsch, the morality of a player’s 
 enjoyments is dependent on the extent to which a gameplay 
(taken as a whole) endorses an immoral act. By introducing 
Young’s refinement (qua the two different motivations), it 
becomes evident that a player’s motivation and therefore 
the reason for enjoying the virtual enactment, at least in the 
case of  M(substitution), should in fact be regarded as immoral 
irrespective of any endorsement of immorality by the video 
game and not because of it. In other words, the immorality 
of one’s act of  enjoyments in the case of  M(substitution) should 
not be dependent on any endorsement of immorality by the 
gameplay, unlike enjoyment in the form of  M(enjoyment).
M(substitution) exemplifies the expressivist’s claim that 
someone who  enjoyss virtually enacting rape or paedo-
philia, or such like, is morally flawed. One might anticipate 
Ostritsch being untroubled by this. He should, however, be 
concerned: for what  M(substitution) adds is not only a refine-
ment to the expressivist’s account—by delineating the nature 
of the enjoyment more precisely—but a means of showing 
how judgements about the morality of this form of enjoy-
ment (which, to reiterate, is compatible with Ostritsch’s 
strong sense of enjoyment) are not dependent on gaming 
content: the very thing Ostritsch seeks to avoid.
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To illustrate, consider the reasoning in 12–14 below, 
which is grounded on the premise that it is immoral to 
 enjoys that which endorses immorality:
 12. Where x prompts us to endorse immorality,
 13. and where S  enjoyss (qua  M(substitution)) x,
 14. then S’s  enjoyments of x (qua  M(substitution)) is immoral
Given what we know about  M(substitution), to assert that 
 enjoyings x (qua  M(substitution)) is immoral because it involves 
 enjoyings (qua  M(substitution)) that which is prompting us to 
endorse immorality (which 12–14 implies) not only deflects 
the direction of the moral condemnation away from its right-
ful place—in this case, player motivation—but also makes 
the moral condemnation of player motivation conditional 
on the morality of the video game content, which it does 
not (and should not) have to be.3 In contrast, in the case of 
 M(enjoyment), given that one can  enjoys enacting that which is 
taboo in the real world without the enactment being mor-
ally condemned (something Ostritsch would not disagree 
with), then any moral condemnation of player  enjoyments 
(qua  M(enjoyment)) is dependent on the immorality of the 
video game content, to the point where the immorality of 
the content becomes necessary and sufficient for the moral 
condemnation of those who  enjoys (qua  M(enjoyment)) enacting 
it. In contrast, in the case of  M(substitution), the immorality of 
gaming content is not necessary for condemnation of this 
kind of player enjoyment. And even if one were to concede 
that it is sufficient for the ascription of some form of moral 
condemnation, such a position diminishes the nature of the 
moral condemnation that should be levelled at the player 
who  enjoyss (qua  M(substitution)) playing games like RapeLay 
or Hatred: for the moral condemnation would be equiva-
lent to that directed at the player who  enjoyss the game (qua 
 M(enjoyment)), yet the motivation of these two players is quite 
different. This morally important difference would be lost if 
one were to retain Ostritsch’s cruder notion of  enjoyments.
Recall the following contradiction which I posited as 
inevitable when using Ostritsch’s notion of  enjoyments:
 (i) The moral condemnation of those who  enjoys x is 
dependent on whether x prompt us to endorse immo-
rality
 (ii) The moral condemnation of those who  enjoys x is not 
dependent on whether x prompt us to endorse immo-
rality
A way to avoid this contradiction is to differentiate 
between  enjoyments qua  M(enjoyment) (which is compatible 
with (i)) and  enjoyments qua  M(substitution) (which is compat-
ible with (ii)). This is something Ostritsch fails to do: hence 
my objection and call for refinement.
Finally, if the immorality of  M(enjoyment) is dependent 
on the extent to which the gameplay one is  enjoyings (qua 
 M(enjoyment)) is endorsing immorality, as Ostritsch demands, 
thereby making such content necessary and sufficient for the 
moral condemnation of player  enjoyments (qua  M(enjoyment)), 
then a prerequisite of this dependency is the veracity of the 
claim that the gameplay (taken as a whole) is endorsing 
immorality. It is towards an examination of this point that 
I now turn.
How does one determine whether a gameplay is 
endorsing immorality?
To assert that one should not  enjoys (qua  M(enjoyment)) that 
which is endorsing the immoral hardly seems remarkable 
or controversial. Indeed, it is a view that allies itself to the 
moral intuition Ostritsch refers to throughout his paper. As 
such, I accept the following as a given: If Hatred is endors-
ing the immoral then one should not enjoy engaging with 
this video game in the manner we are currently discussing 
(hereafter, reference to ‘enjoy’ and its derivatives is refer-
ence to  enjoys qua  M(enjoyment)). But how do we establish 
the veracity of this conditional clause? Perhaps this is the 
more controversial issue. To begin, then, let us look at what 
Ostritsch has to say:
[W]e can find out what kind of worldview (if any) is 
endorsed by a game simply by analyzing it. We do not 
need to talk to the developers. Once a game has been 
published, the developers have no special authority in 
determining its meaning. Imagine the developers of 
Hatred claiming that they did not intend the game to 
be a glorification of murder. Even if we were to believe 
this claim, this would not change anything about the 
fact that Hatred indeed does glorify murder, which is 
easily confirmed simply by looking at the actual game-
play. Because games speak for themselves in the way 
just outlined, I believe it is justifiable to speak about 
games as such being endorsements of certain world-
views. (Ostritsch 2017, p. 125).
Irrespective of whether it was intended or not, for 
Ostritsch, the game Hatred endorses actual murder—insofar 
as it glorifies it—and this, we are told, is a fact. Presumably, 
it is also a fact (the same type of ‘fact’) that the video game 
RapeLay glorifies the sexual assault and rape of women 
(although I appreciate that one ‘fact’ does not necessitate 
the other). The ‘fact’ that x—in this case, Hatred—endorses 
3 In the case of paedophilia (for example), one could engage with a 
video game involving children that does not endorse or even represent 
immorality and still enjoy (qua  M(substitution)) such interactions (see Ali 
2015, for a related discussion).
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immorality (i.e., glorifies murder) can be “easily confirmed 
[Ostritsch tell us] by looking at the actual gameplay” (ibid.). 
This would seem to suggest that its immorality is prima facie 
evident. It is likely, however, that Ostritsch means something 
more than this given that he also states that one can discover 
whether a video game is endorsing a particular immoral 
worldview “simply by analyzing it” (ibid.). He then gives 
a clue (although little more) as to what this might involve:
We are led to believe that it [Hatred] endorses the mor-
ally abhorrent worldview that it is somehow desirable 
to murder because there is no ludic or narrative ele-
ment that would thwart its main gameplay mechanic 
of merciless and brutal mass murder (ibid., p. 123; 
emphasis added).
In the absence of further details about the type of analysis 
required—and the conviction that such an analysis (whatever 
it happens to be) is appropriate—it is my contention that, as 
things stand, it is not in fact clear (or certainly not as clear 
as Ostritsch would have us believe) that Hatred is glorifying 
actual murder. So how can two opposing views be rationally 
held with equal conviction about the same content? To make 
sense of this, let us consider what is involved in (sincerely) 
declaring that “That is immoral”.
In the case of Hatred, in order to claim that the virtual 
murders found within the gameplay, when taken as a whole, 
glorify actual murder, first and foremost, one must believe 
that x (the gameplay taken as a whole) realizes some prop-
erty (P) that constitutes the glorification of actual murder. 
Moreover, to accord with Ostritsch’s moral condemnation of 
such a gameplay, whatever this property is, it must be some-
thing of which one disapproves to such an extent that it is 
seen to justify one’s negative moral attitude. More formally, 
where x constitutes the enactment of murder throughout the 
video game, Hatred:
a) S disapproves of P and believes that x (Hatred) realizes 
P.
b) Given (a), S has a negative attitude towards x because of 
the belief that x realizes P, a property of which S disap-
proves.
c) S’s negative attitude, in the context in which it occurs, 
should be understood as an expression of moral disap-
proval towards x concomitant with the belief that x is 
immoral
The relationship captured within (a–c) is characteristic of 
a meta-ethical approach known as ecumenical expressivism 
(Ridge 2006). Ecumenical expressivism enables different 
people to have a shared negative (moral) attitude towards 
x—insofar as it is something they all disapprove of—but 
for different reasons. To illustrate,  S1 may have a negative 
attitude towards x because of the belief (perhaps established 
after ‘ludic analysis’) that x realizes p (glorifying murder), 
something  S1 happens to disapprove of.  S2 may likewise 
have a negative attitude towards x, only, this time, because 
 S2 believes (perhaps after performing the same analysis) 
that, rather than realizing p, x realizes q (trivializing mur-
der) which is something  S2 happens to disapprove of.  S1 
and  S2 share a negative attitude towards x, only for differ-
ent reasons: namely, because they believe either that (in the 
case of  S1) x realizes p (glorifying murder) or that (in the 
case of  S2) x realizes q (trivializing murder). Importantly, 
though, despite the fact that  S2’s reason for her negative atti-
tude is different to  S1’s, it is not necessarily the case that  S2 
approves of video games that glorify murder (it is more than 
likely that she does not); rather, it is that  S2 does not believe 
that x (qua Hatred) realizes the property of glorifying mur-
der (property p), but does believe that x trivializes murder 
(in virtue of realizing property q). It may also be the case 
that, like  S1 and  S2,  S3 has a negative attitude towards video 
games that either glorify or trivialize murder; but, unlike 
 S1 and  S2, does not have a negative attitude towards x (qua 
Hatred) because she does not hold the belief that x realizes 
either p or q. In fact  S3 does not believe that x realizes any 
property she disapproves of, and so fails to have a negative 
attitude towards x at all.
When one views Ostritsch’s moral condemnation of the 
video game Hatred (or such like) through the lens of ecu-
menical expressivism then for moral agreement to occur—
such that it is agreed that the gameplay of Hatred is (held 
to be) immoral–thereby enabling a challenge to the amoral-
ist retort “it’s just a game” to be sustained, an objectified 
moral norm must be established. Such a norm is, according 
to Young (2014, 2015), a product of constructive ecumenical 
expressivism (CEE). CEE postulates the following: where a 
shared moral attitude occurs with regard to some object or 
event (note that this shared moral attitude is different to a 
more general shared negative attitude; a point I will return 
to), even if different people have different reasons for this 
shared attitude, as a society we are able to create or construct 
a social norm that then acquires its own objectified moral 
standard (Prinz 2007). With the force of social consensus, 
and the moral norm this creates, we are able to adopt a nor-
mative position of our own making, whereby a particular 
(agreed) moral attitude is the one we ought to have, at least 
with regard to this object of moral inquiry. McAteer (2016) 
equates this intersubjective view with the normative stand-
ard espoused by Hume’s common point of view. Under such 
circumstances, the moral disapproval of Hatred, if it were 
an objectified moral norm, would be warranted.4
4 Moreover, under such circumstances, if there were consensus that x 
(Hatred) is immoral then it may be that all or most of those with this 
shared attitude also have the same reason for their attitude (e.g., the 
belief that x endorses actual murder, which of course they disapprove 
of). This would accord well with Ostritsch’s position. Importantly, 
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Despite the strength of Ostritsch’s conviction that Hatred 
endorses immorality by glorifying actual murder, and his 
further belief that this is something one can establish just 
by looking at the gameplay (which seems to involve some 
form of yet-to-be-established analysis reminiscent of that 
carried out within the respective fields of ludology and nar-
ratology), for a negative moral attitude towards Hatred to 
become the norm, at least according to CEE, a consensus 
has to be achieved (although not necessarily for the reason 
Ostritsch asserts regarding Hatred’s endorsement of immo-
rality). It is my contention that this required consensus has 
yet to emerge. Instead, what we currently have (among gam-
ers and wider society) are different beliefs about the proper-
ties video games like Hatred (or RapeLay) realize. Some of 
these different beliefs may culminate in a shared negative 
attitude—some underlying sense of disapproval (perhaps 
grounded on our intuitions)—but this is not the same as 
establishing an overriding consensus that x is immoral (I will 
return to this point in the next section). Because of this, it is 
my further contention that, despite Ostritsch’s view to the 
contrary and even indirect support from some others (e.g., 
Campbell 2014; Liebl 2014), there is currently no objecti-
fied norm (or intersubjective attitude) about a video game 
like Hatred: that it is endorsing (prompting us to endorse) 
actual murder and is therefore immoral for this reason or for 
any other reason. This is because we have yet to establish an 
objectified moral norm proscribing what ought to be mor-
ally unacceptable within a video game (see, for example, 
Tassi 2014, for evidence of fans of Hatred). Such a position 
not only undermines Ostritsch’s view about the morality of 
Hatred’s gameplay (and gameplays of a similar ilk) but also 
the immorality of enjoying such gameplays, given that the 
immorality of this form of enjoyment is dependent on the 
immorality of the video game content: something that is yet 
to be agreed on.
What would it take for consensus to be achieved and 
for Hatred to be considered immoral (or, conversely, not 
immoral). This is a difficult question to answer. Certainly, 
consensus does not require a unanimous verdict. CEE 
allows that there can and likely always will be dissenting 
voices. Moreover, it recognizes that not all the reasons 
that contribute to a shared attitude will be coherent or 
even align with available evidence. If my negative attitude 
towards Hatred—that it is immoral—stems from my disap-
proval of corrupting influences and my belief that all video 
games corrupt then this is easily challenged. The fact that 
the shared attitude is built on different reasons gives the 
attitude a degree of robustness, such that it can withstand 
successful challenges to some of the reasons underlying it: 
because where there are stronger reasons for the attitude 
(coherent and as yet unfalsified) then it will continue in 
its role as objectified norm. What is difficult to quantify is 
how many reasons or how many or who precisely within a 
society must hold the same attitude for it to be constructed 
as an objectified norm (irrespective of the related but dis-
tinct issue of legislation). Certainly the fewer and more 
idiosyncratic the beliefs on which the attitude is built, 
the less robust the attitude will be. CEE is useful insofar 
as it is able to account for a current situation regarding 
moral attitudes—why there is a shared attitude or why 
there is not. What it cannot do is identify (and therefore 
predict) the precise ‘tipping point’ at which consensus will 
be sufficient for a shared attitude (objectified norm) to be 
established.5
In concluding this section, while it seems fairly uncon-
troversial to accept the principle that enjoying that which 
is immoral is itself immoral and therefore accept that the 
morality of one’s enjoyment of video game content (at least 
qua the kind of enjoyment we are discussing in this section) 
is dependent on the morality of the content itself (taken as 
a whole), and even that this constitutes a valid challenge 
to amoralism, what remains unclear is Ostritsch’s proposal 
for how we are meant to establish that “x is immoral”. This 
is an important failing given that the entire dependency 
relation Ostritsch seeks to promote is predicated on the 
veracity of this last claim. If we take CEE to be a means 
of accounting for what is required to establish the verac-
ity of “x is immoral” (i.e., in virtue of a constructed moral 
norm based on a shared negative moral attitude towards x 
without necessarily having shared reasons for this attitude), 
then if it became the established view (for example) that 
Hatred merely represents murder, even gratuitous murder, 
rather than endorses it, as Ostritsch argues is the case with 
regard to Grand Theft Auto V’s satirical portrayal of violence 
despite views to the contrary (e.g., Goerger 2017; Saar 2015; 
Trotman 2014), then one’s enjoyment of the gameplay of 
Hatred would not (should not) be considered immoral.
A difference in belief about properties realized within 
gameplays like Hatred has implications for the likelihood 
of societal consensus (as discussed). As part of this, a dif-
ference in the strength and nature of one’s disapproval 
(given these beliefs) can impact on one’s negative attitude, 
and therefore the likelihood of a consensus when it comes 
to judging whether x should be classified as immoral (as 
opposed to classified as something else) and therefore 
5 I thank the anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this 
point.
Footnote 4 (continued)
though, this need not be the case. CEE is less demanding in terms of 
why x is immoral. Unlike Ostrisch’s account, it does not require that x 
is prompting us to endorse immorality; this can be one of a number of 
reasons people have for their shared moral attitude.
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whether x should be included within one’s (society’s) realm 
of moral obligation, as I shall now discuss.
What does Ostritsch mean by moral obligation?
Ostritsch occasionally refers to a gamer’s moral obligation, 
although he does not give an account of what he means by 
‘obligation’. Certainly, there is a sense in which he seeks to 
identify things that the gamer ought not to do. To illustrate, 
Ostritsch tells us that video games like Hatred and RapeLay 
ought not to be played as ‘fun games’ and ought instead to 
be treated with moral contempt. But what is the strength/
nature of this ‘ought’?
There are actions (in the real-world) one is obligated not 
to do: (inter alia) murder, physical and sexual assault, steal-
ing, lying. If one were to fail to meet this obligation then one 
would have done something morally prohibited, or what is 
sometimes referred to as forbidden (Chisholm 1963). Where 
x is forbidden and S does x then S has done something one 
is morally obliged not to do. Yet there are also actions it has 
been suggested one ought not to do which are not forbidden, 
insofar as one is not obliged not to do them. Driver (1992) 
calls these actions suberogatory. To illustrate: suppose a 
young and healthy man (S) and a heavily pregnant woman 
get on a bus at the same time, S just ahead of the woman. 
There is only one free seat and S takes it, knowing that the 
heavily pregnant woman will have to stand. Through his 
action, S has not violated a moral obligation—he has not 
done something forbidden—but he has, it seems reasonable 
to say, done something wrong. In light of this example, is the 
strength of the moral ought referred to by Ostritsch indica-
tive of an obligation not to do x where x is forbidden, or does 
it allude to refraining from a lesser, suberogatory, action?
A suberogatory action may be considered offensive. 
In fact, when Chisholm (1963) identified a category that 
is arguably the precursor to the suberogatory, he named it 
‘offence’; but it would be contentious to refer to actions 
identified in this way as immoral. Indeed, the purpose of 
identifying the category ‘offence’—or, as we are now calling 
it, suberogatory—was precisely to distinguish actions classi-
fied as such from immoral acts (qua acts we are obliged not 
to perform). The young man’s behaviour on the bus might 
be considered inconsiderate or rude, but hardly immoral.6 
Likewise, if one ought not to play games like RapeLay as 
‘fun games’ then a stronger, more detailed, argument, espe-
cially given the objection raised in the last section, needs 
to be presented for why doing so is immoral rather than 
(at worst) suberogatory. Of course, Ostritsch might retort: 
“Either way, one ought not to do it, and that’s the point”. 
Even so, there is far less moral force behind a claim that one 
ought not to do x because x is, say, in poor taste and liable to 
cause offense, then to say that one ought not to do x because 
it is immoral and we are obliged not to do that which is 
immoral. Ostritsch, it seems, is trying to argue for the latter 
state of affairs but has not shown how the alleged moral obli-
gation, in the case of enjoying playing video games as ‘fun 
games’, is anything other than an ‘ought not to’ command 
directed at a suberogatory action rather than an immoral 
(qua forbidden) action.
In accordance with CEE, if one believes that x realizes 
property p (glorifying actual murder) as Ostritsch does—
such that the gameplay encourages people through their 
enjoyment to delight in the idea of actual murder—then one 
could proffer an argument for why the gameplay is immoral. 
This indeed seems to be Ostritsch’s approach (without men-
tioning CEE, of course). But suppose (and still in accordance 
with CEE), I believe that x realizes q (it trivializes murder, 
rather than glorifies it). I disapprove of the act of trivializing 
murder and, therefore, I have a negative attitude towards 
Hatred. All the same, I ponder thus: Although I consider 
murder itself to be immoral and disapprove of trivializing 
murder, is it actually immoral to treat murder in this way? 
After all, I may surmise that trivializing murder is quite dif-
ferent to encouraging someone to delight in the idea of mur-
der; and even if both have a transcendent quality that moves 
beyond the gameplay7, in the case of delighting in the idea 
of actual murder, one would be conceiving of the immoral 
(i.e., murder) in positive way—as something it is good to 
do—which, in terms of its position on the ‘disapproval 
scale’, elevates it above and beyond that which is occurring 
when one trivializes murder. If trivializing murder is to be 
categorized at all, then I would say that the classification 
‘suberogatory’ is a better fit than ‘immoral’.
For Ostritsch to declare with any moral authority that one 
should be obliged not to enjoy playing a game like Hatred, 
he needs to establish that it does in fact prompt us to endorse 
the immoral. Thus far, this has not been achieved. If, on 
6 One may wish to object to the ‘bus’ example by claiming that it is 
hardly comparable to virtual rape, for example. In response, I would 
argue that it is hardly comparable to actual rape (it goes without say-
ing), but whether it is comparable to virtual rape or the kind of enact-
ments of murder found in Hatred is precisely the point under discus-
sion. We therefore need to be careful not to elevate the moral status of 
such virtual acts and what they may or may not be endorsing above 
what is warranted (given that what they may or may not be endors-
ing has not been established, insofar as there is no consensus). The 
7 Booth (1988), for example, talks of fictional narratives containing 
fixed norms that are intended to be exported from the fictional realm 
(i.e., treat people with respect). These are in contrast to nonce beliefs 
which we are required to hold for the duration of the fiction (e.g., 
zombies walk the Earth in ever increasing numbers).
question as to whether this content fits the category of suberogatory is 




the other hand, and in accordance with CEE, a consensus 
emerges stating that, at its worst, Hatred trivializes actual 
murder rather than endorses it, then while this may warrant 
disapproval, such disapproval does not necessitate the fur-
ther belief that x is immoral. Instead, one may disapprove of 
x and one’s enjoyment of x in a manner commensurate with 
one’s disapproval of any suberogatory act. This means that 
one may consider (in this case) the act of enjoying x (i.e., 
Hatred) to be something that it is better (qua some socially 
preferred state of affairs) not to do, but not something that 
one is morally obliged not to do.
In concluding this section, the legitimacy of the obliga-
tion Ostritsch places on the player not to enjoy x is depend-
ent on the veracity of the claim that “x is immoral”. In 
accordance with CEE, should consensus fail to reflect this 
view and instead decree that Hatred (and such like) does 
not endorse immorality and is not therefore immoral, but 
also be of the opinion that it is offensive, then, arguably, 
such content fits better the category ‘suberogatory’. As a 
suberogatory activity, one is not obliged not to enjoy it and 
therefore not obliged not to play Hatred as a ‘fun game’. 
That said, one may still disapprove of the activity. Given 
this, as is consistent with suberogatory actions, perhaps it 
would be more apt to announce the following: “It would be 
better if one refrained from enjoying a game like Hatred, as 
the game content (taken as a whole) and one’s enjoyment 
of it are liable to cause offence”. Of course, not all gamers 
will agree that video games like Hatred are in poor taste or 
are likely to cause widespread offence; some may not care 
either way. Whatever the gamers’ take on this, in the absence 
of a convincing argument for the veracity of the claim “x 
is immoral”, it is difficult to justify the assertion that one 
should be morally obliged to approach these games in one 
particular way rather than another.
Conclusion
In conclusion, what I hope to have shown is that one can 
share Ostritsch’s view that enjoying immoral video games 
is immoral—and therefore share his ambition to proffer a 
rebuttal of the amoralist’s challenge—without necessar-
ily endorsing the manner in which Ostritsch defends this 
position. Ostritsch is correct to differentiate between senses 
of ‘to enjoy’. His error was in not refining his differentia-
tion more, as I hope to have shown in “Ostritsch’s strong 
sense of ‘enjoyment’ needs refining” section. Further, the 
truth of the proposition ‘enjoying immoral video games is 
immoral’ is something of a moot point in the absence of 
immoral video games or a satisfactory means of establishing 
their immorality. Ostritsch is less than forthcoming about 
how one determines the immorality of video game content, 
and therefore fails to convince when claiming that video 
games like RapeLay and Hatred are immoral because they 
prompt us to endorse the immoral. In the absence of further 
detail from Ostritsch, in “How does one determine whether 
a gameplay is endorsing immorality?” section, I intro-
duced ecumenical expressivism as a way of explaining how 
Ostritsch arrives at the conclusion that Hatred (for example) 
is immoral, followed by CEE as a way of describing what 
would be required for Ostritsch’s view to become a moral 
norm: something I suggested has not yet been established. 
Finally, in “What does Ostritsch mean by moral obligation?” 
section, given the problems of identifying actual cases of the 
moral position on which the proposition ‘enjoying immoral 
video games is immoral’ is predicated—namely, actual com-
mercially available immoral video games—I challenged the 
coherence of Ostritsch’s claim that gamers should be obliged 
not to play games like RapeLay and Hatred.8 Where the 
possibility exists that these gameplays may be construed as 
offensive (in poor taste) rather than immoral, enjoyment of 
these games, in a strong sense (qua  M(enjoyment)), may be, at 
worst, judged to be an example of a suberogatory act, not an 
immoral one. Importantly, the former is not something we 
are obliged not to do.
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